L Introduction
The ill-defined law-fact distinction often stands as the gatekeeper to judicial review of an agency deportation order, restricting noncitizens facing deportation to raising only questions of law when appearing before an appellate court. 1 Even when courts are permitted to review factual questions, they must do so under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review.
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People who fear torture at the hands of government officials in their home country, for example, often cannot seek to reverse an agency deportation order when the error is one of fact.
The wholesale restriction of the review of facts threatens to hamstring reviewing courts from delivering justice. It shifts the focus of appellate briefing to the threshold question of whether the claim raises an issue of law, a complex question, and away from the merits of the case. Moreover, appellate courts must accept agency findings INTERCULTURAL HUAMN RIGHTS LA WREVIEW [Vol. 5 of fact even in the face of widespread criticisms of the quality of those decisions and the politicized nature of administrative judge appointments. 4 The restriction on review most affects cases whose dispositions typically turn on the resolution of factual issues, including claims under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and claims for discretionary relief from deportation like cancellation of removal. In Convention Against Torture claims, for example, noncitizens must establish that it is more likely than not that an agent of their home country will inflict severe pain or suffering on them. These claims often involve extensive fact-finding on the part of the immigration judge regarding conditions in the applicant's home country and the applicant's personal circumstances. At the same time, these claims raise a plethora of issues that arguably are not purely factual, including such critical questions as: "Does the feared mistreatment rise to the level of torture?" "Is the mistreatment likely to happen?" "Has the judge followed the standards governing factual adjudications?" Whether or not a federal appellate court can answer these questions depends on which side of the law-fact divide they fall. Much is at stake for the noncitizens raising these claims. If their claims are factual rather than legal, the law precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction, leaving the agency as the final arbiter of whether or not noncitizens should be deported.
Academics, courts, and litigators have struggled with the lawfact distinction, a distinction whose murkiness is matched only by its ubiquity in the law. Some have argued persuasively that there is no [Vol. 5 answer to whether a question is one of fact or law is the same as the answer to which decision-maker is best suited to make a particular finding or whether an issue is best reviewed under a particular standard of review.
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This article does not directly engage with these important issues. I instead proceed from two, uncontroversial assumptions. First, I assume that the law-fact distinction does exist as a concept in the law, regardless of its ontological or epistemological status. We therefore must reckon with it. This article therefore takes the lawfact distinction as a given in immigration law, engaging with how it has played out in the world of immigration law litigation.' 0 Second, I assume that federal appellate courts are unlikely to rule on the meaning of the law-fact distinction in immigration jurisdictional statutes on the basis of a policy decision about what decision maker is best suited for the job, making it necessary for courts and litigators to theorize about the law-fact distinction as a concept.
This article demonstrates that the basic, analytical concept of a question of law in immigration court decisions is more expansive than is typically understood. I unearth and analyze confusion in immigration case law and propose some ways for us to think more clearly about the law-fact distinction, focusing on questions that involve the application of law to facts that have already been established -questions that are commonly called mixed questions." ("[p] erhaps much of the difficulty in this area stems from the practical truth that the decision to label an issue a 'question of law,' a 'question of fact,' or a 'mixed question of law and fact' is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis.").
10 In taking the law-fact distinction as a given, this article does not address the critically important questions of whether the statutory limitations on judicial review violate the Suspension Clause, Article III, or constitutional due process.
1 See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (defining mixed question as one in which "the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard."). See also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (characterizing as a mixed question the question of whether "historical facts ... amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause"); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-13 (1995) ("application of the controlling legal standard to the historical facts . . . presents a 'mixed question of law and fact.'"). Some have pointed out that the label "mixed question" is unhelpful because the term has been FORMULA FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW Part II of this article briefly traces the history of immigration judicial review, culminating with the REAL ID Act of 2005 and the jurisdictional savings clause contained in it. Part III discusses the concept of a mixed question of law and fact, offering a basic formula that captures the concept of a mixed question as a question of law. In Part IV, I discuss the extent to which courts regard particular mixed questions as legal or factual. Part V suggests a meta-rule formula for mixed questions that offers a way to identify and categorize mixed questions involving a breach of the rules of decision-making.
Part VI addresses the interplay between the concepts of law-fact and discretion, as this has been a focal point of confusion. The article concludes with thoughts about how courts and litigators should proceed in their thinking about the law-fact distinction.
II. Brief History ofImmigration Judicial Review
The history of judicial review over immigration began with our nation's first restrictions on immigration in the late l9th century aimed at people with criminal convictions, prostitutes, people likely to become public charges, and Asian immigrants.
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Noncitizens could seek federal court review over deportation and exclusion orders by way of petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 15 The scope of review in both fora depended on whether the question was legal or factual, making the former subject to de novo review and the latter subject to substantial evidence review.
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Congress transformed the judicial review scheme in 1996 as part of a wholesale revamping of immigration law that restricted Stat. 1214 Stat. , 1276 Stat. (1996 . Section 440(a) of AEDPA stated that orders of deportation based on certain criminal grounds of deportation "shall not be subject to review by any court." The specific grounds were 8 U.S.C. § § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1991) (aggravated felony), 1251(a)(2)(D) (miscellaneous offenses), or 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (crimes of moral turpitude). Id. savings clause] is to permit judicial review over those issues that were historically reviewable on habeas."). As noted previously, the issue of whether the REAL ID savings clause has provided a constitutionally adequate alternative to habeas review is critical but beyond the scope of this article.
III. The Basic Formula of a Mixed Question
The REAL ID savings clause has planted the law-fact distinction front and center in immigration law jurisprudence. If a question is subject to a jurisdictional bar, it is only saved under the savings clause if it is a question of law. Questions of fact remain outside the savings clause. While the law-fact distinction has often governed the choice of a standard of review, it now stands as the sole gatekeeper to review over any question deemed to fall within a jurisdictional bar.
The savings clause presupposes a simple image-one that clearly delineates fact from law. The image is of two separate and discretely bounded sets of questions: one set includes constitutional questions and questions of law and another set contains questions of fact. As discussed below, however, this image of non-overlapping, insular categories of questions is far too simple and, among other things, ignores the existence of so-called mixed questions of law and fact.
A mixed question is commonly defined as involving the application of law to facts that have already been established either because they have been adjudicated or because they are not in dispute.29 A mixed question is so termed because it involves both law and fact. Mixed questions contrast with legal questions that involve only statutory or constitutional interpretation.
Mixed questions also contrast with factual questions involving the "who, what, when, and how" of historical events.
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A single case might easily involve all three types of questions, namely statutory, mixed, and factual. For example, an asylum case might raise the statutory legal question of how to interpret the term "persecution" in the refugee definition.
3 1 A factual question in the same case might be whether government agents from 29 See supra note 11.
30 The Supreme Court has described these types of facts as "basic," "primary," or "historical." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963) , overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) . See also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665 (1987) (using the term "historical fact"). FORMULA FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW the applicant's home country beat the applicant and threatened to kidnap her child. A mixed question would be whether the specific mistreatment suffered by the applicant meets the legal definition of persecution.
Mixed questions of law and fact may be understood abstractly as fitting a simple formula. If X denotes the legal rule at issue and A and B are the established facts, the basic mixed question formula is:
Do establishedfacts A-B satisfy rule X?
In the asylum example above, the established facts (A and B) are that government agents beat the applicant and threatened to kidnap her child. The rule (X) is the legal definition of persecution. Plugged into the general formula, the mixed question is: Does the beating and threatened kidnapping satisfy the definition of persecution? The question involves the application of law (the definition of persecution) to facts (the mistreatment).
The obvious next question is whether mixed questions like this one fall on the law or fact side of the law-fact divide. At the very highest level of abstraction, some courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have stated that the application of law to fact is a question of law. As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. St. Cyr has stated that "errors of law" traditionally considered in habeas proceedings included review of "the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes." 32 The court, however, has not yet ruled on whether the application of law to fact constitutes a legal question within the meaning of the REAL ID savings clause.
3 3 The Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, have taken up the issue, all finding that such questions are questions of law. 34 The Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits disagree, finding that the REAL ID savings clause only applies to "pure" legal claims or claims involving "statutory construction."
Under the approach of these courts, the only questions reviewable as questions of law are those involving the interpretation or constitutionality of a statute. The application of a statutory definition to the particular facts of a case would be considered a factual question.
Even more controversy and confusion abound when courts analyze mixed questions in actual cases. We can best understand this phenomenon by examining the variety of ways in which courts have handled questions that fit the basic formula of a mixed question. In many of these cases, the questions at issue straightforwardly fit the basic mixed question formula and thus we would expect them to be treated as legal questions. But even courts that accept mixed questions as legal nonetheless characterize the claim as an unreviewable factual question. Alternatively, courts characterize the question as a reviewable legal claim but then, without explanation, employ the substantial evidence standard of review for factual questions. 
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IV Disparate Treatment of Particular Mixed Questions
Depending on the precise issue, courts may or may not agree on the law/fact status of a mixed question. For example, courts overwhelmingly treat mixed questions as legal questions subject to de novo review if they involve the question of whether a particular type of criminal conviction falls within a given ground of deportation. Rewritten to conform to the basic formula, the mixed question is:
Does the criminal conviction satisfy the ground of removal?
Courts of appeals universally characterize this question as a question of law, involving the application of law (the removal ground) to an established fact (the criminal conviction as evidenced by the criminal documents). 3 6 In an apparent contradiction, the three circuits to hold that the REAL ID savings clause excludes mixed questions have characterized as legal the question of whether a particular criminal conviction triggers removal under the statute. 37 Another example of a mixed question being treated as a question of law is whether certain types of mistreatment (the established facts) rise to the level of "torture" within the meaning of Article 3 in the Convention Against Torture (the rule). 38 
2010]
Does the mistreatment satisfy the definition of torture?
The two appellate courts to rule on this precise question have characterized it as a reviewable question of law. 39 The Eleventh Circuit has explained: "Whether a particular fact pattern amounts to 'torture' requires a court to apply a legal definition to a set of undisputed or adjudicated historical facts." The court found that this "mixed question of law and fact" falls "squarely and unambiguously" within the REAL ID's savings clause. This agreement disappears, however, when we look beyond cases addressing removability for a criminal conviction and the definition of torture. Courts disagree about the law-fact status of applied legal standards involving the likelihood of something happening. For example, the legal standard for a grant of deferral of removal under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture is that the person must face a "substantial" likelihood of being tortured. 41 The question then becomes whether the likelihood of torture is reviewable as a legal question because it is a mixed question of law. The question fits the basic formula of a mixed question:
Do the established facts satisfy the rule that the applicant is substantially likely to be tortured?
Courts disagree about whether this is a question of law. The Third Circuit has held that the likelihood of torture is a reviewable legal question, characterizing the question as involving "not disputed facts but whether the facts, even when accepted as true, sufficiently demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she will be subject to persecution or torture upon removal [ Circuit has agreed. 4 3 Other courts, however, have held the likelihood of torture to be an unreviewable factual question. 44 For these courts, the probability of an applicant being tortured in the future is purely factual, involving no legal rule. In so holding, however, these courts do not explain how the substantial likelihood of torture standard fails to qualify as a legal rule. As demonstrated above, the application of the likelihood standard to the established facts of a case conforms to the basic formula of a mixed question and therefore could be treated as a question of law.
There is also a circuit split in cases involving the exceptions to the one-year filing deadline for asylum claims. As discussed in Part II, asylum applicants must establish "by clear and convincing evidence" that they have filed for asylum within one year of arriving in the United States. 4 5 A statutory exception exists for applicants who can demonstrate material "changed" or "extraordinary" circumstances.46 Because the statute prohibits review of one-year Although the question conforms to the mixed question formula, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to have ruled that the application of one-year deadline exceptions is reviewable as a question of law.
8
The Second Circuit has taken an intermediate, case-by-case approach.
9
All other circuits have ruled that the circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application" within the one-year deadline). 2006) , the court recognized that the term "questions of law" within the meaning of the REAL ID savings clause includes claims that raise issues involving the application of law to fact, including in the asylum one-year deadline context. The court stated that " [t] he mere use of the term 'erroneous application' of a statute will not, however, convert a quarrel over an exercise of discretion into a question of law." Id. at 331. The court's approach is to "look to the nature of the argument being advanced in the petition" to see if the petitionef s challenge is "merely an objection to the IJ's factual findings and the balancing of factors in which FORMULA FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW application of the one-year deadline exceptions to established facts falls outside the REAL ID savings clause as an unreviewable question of fact. 50 The Ninth Circuit's approach finds support in the basic formula of a mixed question. As discussed above, the question of whether established facts qualify as either "changed" or "extraordinary" circumstances fits the basic formula of the application of law to fact. One caveat regarding the court's analysis, however, is that the court indicated the result would have been different if it had ruled that the one-year deadline determination was discretionary.
As discussed in Part V, courts often equate discretionary determinations with factual ones, even though they are analytically distinct.
Adding to the confusion surrounding the treatment of mixed questions, the Ninth Circuit categorized the one-year deadline question as a reviewable legal question but then have proceeded in a seemingly contradictory fashion to apply the substantial evidence test, the standard for factual questions. 5 Jan.11, 2010) . As is discussed in detail in Part V, courts have nonetheless ruled on legal issues raised in the context of the one-year deadline. E.g., Shi Jie Ge v. Holder, 588 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2009) (court found reviewable legal claim in one year deadline case, agency misapplied the "changed circumstances exception" to the filing deadline, misapplied the plain terms of the regulation, focused exclusively on the date of his enrollment as a member of the CDP and ignored regulation which defines changed circumstances far more broadly).
si See supra note 16 for an explanation of these standards. See also Dhital v.
Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008) (employing "substantial evidence" standard to find that established facts had not met the "extraordinary circumstances" standard for forgiving late-filed asylum application); Husyev v. application of the "changed circumstances" standard was a reviewable legal question, the court without explanation used the standard for factual questions to hold that "the record does not compel the conclusion that [the petitioner] has shown 'changed circumstances."' 52 Other courts have also pigeonholed a question as legal but then reviewed it under the substantial evidence test.
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In sum, courts vary widely in their treatment of specific mixed questions in immigration law. Often the law-fact distinction is under-theorized. Courts that have supplied the most explanation have acted inconsistently with their conclusions by applying the standard of review for facts to questions they have determined to be legal.
V The Meta-Rule Formula For Mixed Questions
The discussion above addresses the basic formula for a mixed question: Do established facts A-B satisfy rule X? This section analyzes a particular type of mixed question, namely claims in which the litigant alleges that the agency has breached the rules governing fair decision-making-what I will call meta-rules. The key idea is that, in making a particular determination, an adjudicator must follow a certain rule governing decision-making. A reviewing court looks at the administrative record and decision (the established facts A-B) to determine whether the adjudicator followed the rule of decision-making (rule X).
For example, a court reviewing a case under the Convention Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding the same with respect to the "extraordinary circumstances" exception).
52 Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 657.
Against Torture might ask whether the immigration judge considered all relevant evidence when determining that the applicant was not previously harmed by government officials in his home country. In a case involving discretionary relief from deportation, a reviewing court could ask whether the immigration judge employed the correct legal standard. The meta-rule formula for a mixed question can be stated in general form as:
Based on the established facts A-B in the administrative record and decision, did the judge violate rule X regarding how determinations should be made?
Courts routinely review meta-rule violations as questions of law, although they typically do not identify these questions as involving the application of a rule (the rule of decision making) to established facts (the administrative record and decision)i 4
Examples of meta-rules are that adjudicators must consider relevant evidence in the record; 5 5 consider and rule on all claims 54 For example, the Seventh Circuit has provided the following explanation of what it considers to be a legal challenge involving a breach of the rules of decision-making:
[A]ll the court can decide is whether the Board committed an error of law. That will usually be a misinterpretation of a statute, regulation, or constitutional provision. But it could also be a misreading of the Board's own precedent, or the Board's use of the wrong legal standard, or simply a failure to exercise discretion or to consider factors acknowledged to be material to such an exercise. A key characteristic of a meta-rule formulation of a mixed question is that the determination under review by an appellate court need not be a legal issue but could be a historical fact such as 70 whether an event occurred or not.
It could, for example, be a credibility determination. As discussed in Part VI, it could be a discretionary determination. While the questions of whether an event occurred or whether a witness is telling the truth are straightforwardly factual questions, the question of whether a metarule was violated in the course of deciding these factual issues is a their discretion when making discretionary determinations. As discussed below in Part VI, courts routinely characterize abuse of discretion claims as factual rather than legal, however. Abuse of discretion claims are most successful when the abuse stems from the decision-maker's failure to follow another meta-rule, such as one of the rules listed above. A further complication of claims involving the abuse of discretion is that it is not only a rule of decision-making but a standard of review. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 827, 834 (2010) If fact-finding involves the violation of a meta-rule, the reviewing court must treat it as a mixed question rather than as a factual one. Courts that rule otherwise often confuse the difference between a litigant's request for an appellate court to review how the agency applied a substantive rule to the facts of a case with a litigant's request for an appellate court to decide whether the agency followed the right rules governing decision-making.n While both fit the mixed question formula, the latter type of request, unlike the first, enjoys greater acceptance as a legal claim. Given this broad acceptance, litigants raising mixed questions as legal claims are typically more successful when they argue meta-rule violations. Indeed, in jurisdictions where particular mixed questions have been deemed factual, claims involving meta-rule violations are likely a litigant's only hope of gaining review.
VI. Mixed Questions and the Exercise ofDiscretion
Perhaps no thornier appellate issue exists in immigration law than the issue of whether and how to review discretionary decisions. After 1996, when Congress repealed judicial review over certain discretionary determinations,c72courts have had to engage in the difficult work of deciding whether a claim involves the prohibited review of the exercise of discretion and, if so, whether the claim is nonetheless reviewable under the REAL ID savings clause as a question of law.
The Supreme Court recently held that the jurisdictional bar on discretionary decisions does not extend to discretionary decisions that are not expressly "specified" in the relevant subchapter of the INA as "in the discretion of the Attorney General." 7 3 It is also wellsettled that statutory interpretation issues, relating to discretionary v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2004 ) (holding that the decision to revoke a visa is reviewable because there are non-discretionary standards for the courts to apply), with Jilin Pharmaceutical USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 203 -04 (3d Cir. 2006 ) (holding that because the statute states that the Attorney General "may" revoke a visa "at any time" the decision is specified as discretionary in the statute FORMULA FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW discretionary and within a jurisdictional bar but alleged to be nonetheless reviewable as an error of law either because they fit either the basic or the meta-rule formula for a mixed question.
The above discussion of the meta-rule formula helps us to understand one way in which a reviewable mixed question can be embedded in a discretionary determination. Recall that the meta-rule formula is: Based on the administrative record and decision (the facts A-B) , did the judge violate rule X in making the determination? As pointed out above, the determination could be a factual determination.
In the asylum example in Part III, a factual determination would be whether the applicant was beaten by government agents. It could also be a discretionary determination, such as whether a noncitizen applicant merits cancellation of removal. 7 Regardless of whether an appellate court is precluded from reviewing whether the noncitizen merited cancellation as a matter of discretion, it would not be precluded from reviewing whether the agency violated a rule governing how that discretionary cancellation of removal decision was to be made. In the context of reviewing discretionary determinations like a denial of cancellation of removal, for example, a reviewing court can consider whether the agency applied the right legal standard in a hardship determination. 7 8 n The discretionary remedy of cancellation of removal exists in the statute in two formulations: one for permanent residents and one for nonpermanent residents. 78 E.g., Sumbundu v. Holder, 2010 WL 1337221 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding jurisdiction to consider claim that the agency "applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating" a discretionary good moral character determination in a cancellation case); Gomez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 370, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2009) (jurisdiction to review legal claim that "the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard by focusing on the present circumstances of his children rather than on the future hardships that they would face if he were removed" but no jurisdiction to review claim that the "BIA applied an incorrect legal standard by failing to adequately consider certain factors that have been considered relevant in other BIA decisions"); Mendez v. Holder, 566 F. Similarly, courts that have deemed discretionary the determination of whether an asylum applicant falls within an exception to the one-year deadline can nonetheless reverse an agency decision premised on the wrong effective date of the one-year deadline.
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More conceptually difficult are discretionary claims that fall within a jurisdictional bar but that fit the basic (rather than the meta) formula for a mixed question-in other words, claims involving review of the application of law to established facts in a discretionary determination. Classic examples involve discretionary hardship determinations in adjudications of relief from removal like cancellation of removal. 80 In these cases, the agency must weigh the evidence to determine whether hardship to applicant and/or a qualifying family member rises to a certain level. [t] o the extent that a petition asks us to review a discretionary or factual determination, however, we still lack jurisdiction"); Zhang v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding without explanation that "the instant petition, in challenging the BIA's discretionary extreme-hardship determination, does not raise any 'constitutional [Vol. 5 Courts that rush to decide that a discretionary claim is unreviewable typically fail to proceed to the second step in the analysis to consider whether the REAL ID savings clause reinstates reviewability because the question is legal. These courts confuse the discretionary-nondiscretionary distinction with the fact-law distinction, incorrectly assuming that all discretionary determinations are factual determinations. 8 5 This assumption ignores how a determination might be discretionary and legal at the same time. The hardship determination discussed above demonstrates how a question can involve the discretionary weighing of established facts to determine whether the relevant legal standard of hardship has been met. [t] o the extent that a petition asks us to review a discretionary or factual determination, however, we still lack jurisdiction"); Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117 , 1130 (10th Cir. 2006 (holding that one-year deadline claims are unreviewable because they are discretionary determinations without deciding whether they are legal); De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2006 ) (finding REAL ID savings clause to not apply to discretionary determinations, presumably based on unspoken assumption that a discretionary determination cannot be a question of law) (citing Xiao Ji Chen v. USD01, 434 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2006)) Nothing about the discretionary application of law to fact converts its nature from legal to factual. Discretionary applications of law to fact are simply a subset of applications of law to fact generally. This is not to say that discretionary applications of law are identical to nondiscretionary applications of law in all respects. The two differ in significant ways.
First, the discretionary application of law to fact is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard rather than a de novo standard. 86 Second, an agency's discretionary decision may be unreviewable if there is not sufficient law for an appellate court to apply. 8 7 This unreviewability, however, does not stem from the question being factual rather than legal. To the contrary, it stems from the question being a legal, mixed question that cannot be reviewed because the legal standard at issue has not been sufficiently elaborated.
Some courts appear to evince an understanding that discretionary determinations can involve the application of law to fact. The Ninth Circuit in Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, for example, found the hardship standard to be "subjective," making it impossible to "review an JJ's application of such standard to the facts of a case, be they disputed or otherwise." 88 This passage suggests that the court understood that the question did involve the application of law to facts, but found the standard too ill-defined to permit it to be a 86 Kucana v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 827, 834 (2010) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992)). 87 In the context of Section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedures Act, the Supreme Court has drawn the "committed to agency discretion" exception extremely narrowly, applying it only "in those rare circumstances where the relevant statute 'is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion."' 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
821, 830 (1985)).
88 Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2009). The court, however, recognized that it did have jurisdiction over a meta-rule claim, namely that the agency had misapplied the wrong legal standard. Id. at 979. The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to consider the application of the hardship standard to the facts of the case even though the petitioners had conceded that the court lacked jurisdiction "to reweigh the evidence underlying the [agency 's] conclusion that removal would not cause their children an 'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.'" Id. reviewable legal question. 89 At no point, however, did the court satisfactorily explain how the subjectivity of the standard could transform a legal claim involving the application of law to fact into a factual claim.
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Although most courts have found unreviewable the application of hardship standards to established facts, a minority view exists. In Mendez v. Holder, the Second Circuit suggested that, if it had not been not bound by prior precedent, it would have been "inclined to hold that the question of whether an alien has established 'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship' is a determination that we have jurisdiction to review, just as we can review decisions dealing with the other eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal." 91 Unlike other circuits to decide the matter, the Second 8 The court, however, did not go so far as to say that there was insufficient law to apply under the standard of the Administrative Procedures Act. The "committed to agency discretion" standard under Section 701(a) (2) as applications of contoured statutory language to a particular set of facts."). 90 The court pointed to the subjectivity of the hardship standard to distinguish its holding from its prior decision in Ramadan v. Gonzales, in which it found the application of the asylum one-year deadline exceptions to be a question of law. See The Second Circuit had previously ruled that the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" determination is not reviewable except where the determination is made without rational justification or based on an "erroneous legal standard" or is "flawed by an error of law." Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2008) . For a discussion of how these meta-rule violations permit review, see supra Part V. The discussion in Mendez is consistent with Judge Calabresi's discussion in his concurrence in Zhang, in which he argues that the extreme hardship determination falls within the REAL ID savings clause as a question of law because it involves the "application[] of contoured statutory language to a particular set of facts." Circuit in Mendez v. Holder did not consider it unworkable to review application of a hardship standard.
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Courts must guard against conflating the discretionarynondiscretionary distinction with the fact-law distinction. When courts conclude that a discretionary bar has been triggered, they cannot end their inquiry. The critical next question is whether the issue is one of law reviewable under the REAL ID savings clause. If a discretionary issue involves the application of law to an established set of facts, then arguably a reviewing court has jurisdiction. Courts must engage with difficult question of whether the application of law to established facts in a truly discretionary determination is a question of law.
VII. Conclusion
We have seen how virtually any claim that is not asking for review of a historical fact is a claim that fits either the basic or metarule formula of a mixed question involving the application of law to established facts-a question that the U.S. Supreme Court and many U.S. courts of appeals have characterized as a legal question. This is not to say that litigants will be successful in every case that arguably fits the formula, far from it. If anything, the fact that virtually all disputes fit a version of the formula is surely evidence of the inadequacy of the law-fact distinction itself.
While the law-fact distinction may not bear up well under . 2006) . In Sumbundu v. Holder, the court similarly suggested that discretionary determination can be reviewable as a question of law if there is a sufficiently detailed standard to apply. 2010 WL 1337221 (2d Cir. 2010) ("with moral character decisions under the catchall clause, there may not be an algorithm, but there remains a standard-good moral character-which the agency must find."). The court, however, ultimately characterized the petitioner's claim as a claim that the agency failed to apply the correct standard. In other words, it characterized the claim as what this article discusses as a meta-rule violation. close analysis, it nonetheless permeates our law. Courts must begin to fashion a more conceptually rigorous approach. Litigators must understand and employ the wide range of arguments available to them to secure judicial review.
The above discussion demonstrates the widespread confusion on how to treat claims that fit the formula of the application of a legal standard to an established fact. While there is considerable agreement that mixed questions involving alleged meta-rule violations are legal claims, there is considerable confusion about mixed questions involving the application of legal standards to established facts, especially when courts perceive the standard to be ill-defined. While arguably all mixed questions are legal questions, it is unrealistic and naive for litigants to expect success given the state of the law and the legitimate concern of reviewing courts that it is difficult to weigh evidence under a standard involving many factors.
Despite these difficulties, the starting point of any analysis must be the basic formula of a mixed question and the notion that the application of law to fact is a legal question. It is incumbent on courts that deviate from these basic propositions to clearly acknowledge their departure and to explain why. To do any less is not only intellectually dishonest, but deepens the already existing incoherence in our case law. As for litigants, some battles regarding questions that fit the basic formula are already lost at certain U.S. courts of appeals, but many remain. Even in substantive areas in which a court of appeals has categorically characterized a type of mixed claim as factual and unreviewable, litigants can still argue that the agency has violated applicable meta-rules-the rules of decision making-in a particular case. Litigants can and must analyze their cases to unearth any and all legal errors committed in the course of agency decision making. By proceeding from analyses framed by the basic and meta-rule formulas for mixed questions, litigants can seek to maximize reviewability in a world of limited review and federal courts can abide by their constitutional Article III mandate.
